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Introduction
MOTHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS are considered intimate by na-
ture,1 and maternal infanticide—the murder of an infant by its
mother—and its subset of neonaticide—when the killing occurs
within twenty-four hours of a child’s birth—are uncommon in the
United States relative to other murders today.2 Yet, infanticide has a
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1. For example, writer Ayelet Waldman created controversy when she stated in a New
York Times article that she loved her husband more than her children. Bob Thompson, ‘Bad
Mother’s’ Day, WASH. POST, May 5, 2009, at C1. “Neonaticides consist of behaviors by women
that are absolutely at odds with normative conceptions of motherhood and maternity com-
monly held by society.” Judith E. Macfarlane, Note, Neonaticide and the “Ethos of Maternity”:
Traditional Criminal Law Defenses and the Novel Syndrome, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 175, 208
(1998). Perhaps even feminists might not identify with mothers who harm their children.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 137 (1993). It is therefore
often difficult to defend these defendants, especially in front of juries. See State v.
Biegenwald, 594 A.2d 172, 222–23 (N.J. 1991) (“Likewise, infanticide, foeticide, and uxori-
cide have the potential to divert jurors from their duty to assess the defendant to their
desire to avenge the victim.”); Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonati-
cide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense”, 10 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 10–11 (2003).
2. See Margaret G. Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness Prevention
and the Promise of Saved Lives, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1548, 1548 (2004). There are an esti-
mated 250 neonaticides reported in the United States each year. LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ &
NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, FILICIDE 72 (2000). In
regards to infanticide, it is more difficult to know exact numbers because “[a]bsent the
fortuitous presence of an eyewitness, infanticide . . . would largely go unpunished.” United
States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Lynne Marie Kohm & Thomas
Scott Liverman, Prom Mom Killers: The Impact of Blame Shift and Distorted Statistics on Punish-
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long history and occurs worldwide.3 Infanticide was quite common in
colonial America, during which time an estimated one-third of all kill-
ings were infanticides.4 Many infanticides are driven by gender prefer-
ences in countries that limit births and favor males.5 Others, like those
common in Ancient Greece,6 target unwanted, vulnerable, or disabled
children.7
When neonaticide occurs in the United States today, the factual
pattern is consistent to the point of being archetypal: a young woman8
denies her pregnancy until she finds herself in labor;9 mentally and
ment for Neonaticide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 43, 53–57 (2002) (discussing the lack of
accurate statistics tracking infanticide).
3. Susan C.M. Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual
Concerns, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 439, 439 (Glenn
Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984).
Infanticide has been practiced over a wide span of time and in many differ-
ent cultures . . . .
. . . . Japanese farmers spoke of infanticide as ‘thinning out,’ as they did with their
rice fields. . . . Eskimos left babies out in the snow, while in the Brazilian jungle,
undesired infants were left under the trees. In London in the 1860s, dead infants
were a common sight in parks and ditches.
Id. (citation omitted).
4. Perlin, supra note 1, at 10. But see Kohm & Liverman, supra note 2, at 51 (“During
the puritanical colonial times, infanticide was thought to be one of the more brutal crimes,
and many women who murdered their children were executed.”).
5. For a discussion of infanticide of female babies as a means of population control
in India, see Mohit Sahni, Missing Girls in India: Infanticide, Feticide and Made-to-Order
Pregnancies? Insights From Hospital-Based Sex-Ratio-at-Birth Over the Last Century, PLOS ONE
(May 21, 2008), http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.
pone.0002224. In China, see Amy Hampton, Comment, Population Control in China: Sacrific-
ing Human Rights for the Greater Good?, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 340–41 (2003).
The cross-cultural nature of infanticide has prompted one commentator to evaluate cul-
tural defenses for infanticides in the United States. Michele Wen Chen Wu, Comment,
Culture Is No Defense for Infanticide, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 975, 1018–20
(2003).
6. Scrimshaw, supra note 3, at 439.
7. See, e.g., Aquila Mazzinghy Alvarenga, Who Cares About the Rights of Indigenous Chil-
dren? Infanticide in Brazilian Indian Tribes, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 17, 26–27 (2011).
8. In his case study, Psychiatrist Phillip J. Resnick found that 89% of the neonaticidal
mothers were under twenty-five years old. He also discovered that 81% were single, 17%
were psychotic, and only 8.5% suffered from serious depression. Phillip J. Resnick, Murder
of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1415 (1970); see
also Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms With Modern American Infanticide, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 3, 28 (2004) (“Most women . . . accused of neonaticide are
young and single.”).
9. In her study of forty-seven cases of maternal neonaticide, Michelle Oberman
found that
the women [all] experienced severe cramping and stomach pains, which they
often attributed to a need to defecate. They spent hours alone, most often on the
toilet, often while others were present in their homes. At some point during these
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otherwise unprepared for the child, she either abandons the baby or
commits some other action leading the baby’s death.10 Infanticide
cases share certain similarities with the neonaticide paradigm de-
scribed above. Common factors causing maternal neonaticide and in-
fanticide are postpartum depression,11 unpreparedness for
parenting,12 youth of the mother, or mental illness.13
Yet, despite the strong factual similarities common to most in-
stances of neonaticide and infanticide, these cases produce significant
sentencing inconsistencies, ranging from two years imprisonment to
the death penalty.14 Furthermore, these crimes are frequently
hours, they realized that they were in labor. They endured the full course of labor
and delivery without making any noise.
Oberman, supra note 8, at 29–30.
10. Id. at 30.
11. Christine Ann Gardner, Note, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting
Away With Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 966 (1990).
12. ANIA WILCZYNSKI, CHILD HOMICIDE 79 (1997).
13. Oberman, supra note 8, at 39-45. Similar psychiatric findings have been made in
English and Australian cases. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 81–85. One study of English
infanticide cases noted that 64.3% of female offenders utilize psychiatric pleas (versus only
30% of male offenders). Id. at 118–19; see also Ania Wilczynski, Mad or Bad? Child-killers,
Gender and the Courts, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 422 (1997). Resnick’s study, quoted above,
found that women who commit neonaticide were significantly less likely to suffer from
psychosis and depression than those who murder their children later. Resnick, supra note
8, at 1415.
14. E.g., United States v. Gibson, 17 C.M.R. 911, 916 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (mother con-
victed of neonaticide sentenced by court-martial to be dishonorably discharged, to forfeit
all pay and allowances, and to be confined to hard labor for 13 years—reduced to five years
by convening authority); People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 621 (Ill. 2004) (affirming con-
viction of neonaticidal mother convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years
in prison before her conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence); People v. Sims,
750 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (affirming conviction of neonaticidal mother sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, avoiding death sentence in a capital murder trial); State v.
Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1259, 1260, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming the 60 year imprisonment
of a mother convicted of first-degree murder for infanticide); Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d
1077, 1081–83, 1092 (Ind. 1990) (affirming two consecutive sentences of 60 years each for
two infanticides committed by the mother); Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1096
(Pa. 2005) (reviewing a neonaticidal mother’s “sentence of life imprisonment without pa-
role and a consecutive aggregate six months to nineteen years incarceration . . . .”); Capps
v. State, 478 S.W.2d 905, 906–07 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) (affirming a two year prison
sentence for a mother convicted of voluntary manslaughter for her act of infanticide)
(overruled on other grounds); Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 850–51 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (infanticidal mother’s sentence reformed from death to life imprisonment); Routier
v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (affirming a mother’s death sentence
for the murder of her six year old son); see also Beth E. Bookwalter, Note, Throwing the Bath
Water Out with the Baby: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 1185, 1194 (1998) (“The legal confusion surrounding the crime of neonaticide
often creates disparate results in factually similar cases.”). Such sentencing disparities “can
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overcharged and under-convicted.15 On the federal level, neonaticide
and infanticide may be sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for murder—guidelines that, when initially
promulgated, were influenced by sentences for completely dissimilar
murder cases.16 Because neonaticide and infanticide do not factually
conform to the average statutory definitions of murder or manslaugh-
ter,17 the mismatch produces irregular sentences when those statutes
are inappropriately applied. The lack of consistent statutory guidance
in these cases poses a challenge both to prosecutors charging defend-
ants and defense lawyers defending them, as well as to judges in sen-
tencing defendants.18
In pursuit of achieving greater sentencing consistency in mater-
nal neonaticide and infanticide cases, this Article proposes the statu-
tory separation of these crimes from general murder and
manslaughter, as is currently done in England.19 While certain in-
stances of neonaticide and infanticide may be classified as quintessen-
tial murder or manslaughter cases,20 this Article argues that the
availability of an infanticide statute would more consistently dispose of
the paradigm infanticide and neonaticide cases. This proposed infan-
ticide statute, which would necessarily encompass neonaticide as well,
never be the stuff of fairness. They signal something seriously wrong.” Eileen Foley, Women
Who Kill Their Babies, TOLEDO BLADE, May 23, 2002, at A15.
15. Oberman, supra note 8, at 96.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Deegan (Deegan I), 605 F.3d 625, 637 (8th Cir. 2010)
(Bright, J., dissenting) (“[N]eonaticide does not now, nor has it ever, come within the
‘run-of-the-mine’ guidelines for second-degree murder . . . .”).
17. See, e.g., id.
18. For example, in a strongly worded dissent regarding the majority’s reversal of a
first-degree murder conviction in a maternal neonaticide case, one Illinois judge
remarked,
[f]or all practical purposes, it is now legal in Illinois for a parent to murder his or
her newborn infant. With today’s decision, the majority sends the clear signal
that, when a parent is charged with murdering a newborn baby, this court will not
apply the standard of review in the same manner as we would in any other crimi-
nal case. We will draw previously unheard of inferences and presumptions in
favor of the defendant and will reward the defendant for attempting to cover up
the crime.
Ehlert, 811 N.E.3d at 633 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Oberman, supra note 8, at 96
(noting that these crimes are often overcharged and under-convicted).
19. See infra Part III.A; Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Note, Rethinking the
Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3109
(1999) (arguing for a separate neonaticide provision in state manslaughter penal codes so
that teenage mothers committing these crimes can be adjudicated in juvenile court).
20. For example, consider those committed with intent while fulfilling the other statu-
tory elements of murder. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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need not be based on medical justifications as was done in England.21
Instead, the proposed legislation would respond to the problem of
sentencing inconsistency alone, without the necessity for implicating
medical justifications. The exact sentencing structure of such a stat-
ute, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.22
It should be noted that, while neonaticide and infanticide may be
committed by an outsider or by either parent—with the term “filicide”
denoting the killing of one’s own child23—this article will focus on the
maternal neonaticides and infanticides composing the paradigm cases
described above. This is a tragic category that affects the entire family,
including the father of the child.24 Given the frequently consistent
facts common to most maternal neonaticide and infanticide cases,25
and the divergent sentencing results that those cases produce,26 these
are the cases that require particular attention.
Part I begins by considering the definitions and characteristics of
neonaticide and infanticide, as well as the important preventative ef-
forts aimed at their elimination. Part II examines the current treat-
21. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
22. Any penalties could be statutorily established based on further considerations,
perhaps using a sliding scale to reflect the nuanced factual differences among these cases.
The first step in formulating new legislation, however, is to analyze its advantages and
disadvantages, which is what this article seeks to do.
23. Resnick, supra note 8, at 325. Other categories of child killings include those com-
mitted by women who are not the child’s mother and those committed by men. Regarding
the former, compare United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 128–29 (4th Cir. 1973) (af-
firming a life sentence for a woman convicted of first-degree murder for killing her foster
son), Commonwealth v. Boykin, 298 A.2d 258, 259–60 (Pa. 1972) (affirming a female care-
taker’s conviction and ten-year prison sentence for the voluntary manslaughter of an infant
in her care), and Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 31 A.2d 155, 158 (Pa. 1943) (affirming a life
sentence for first-degree murder committed by the infant’s aunt), with cases cited in supra
note 14. For an excellent analysis of the differences between filicides and “stranger dan-
ger,” see WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 171–79. Dr. Wilczynski suggests that non-familial
infanticide offenders may receive higher sentences when their crimes include a sexual as-
sault—much more likely to be true in non-familial cases. Id. at 178. Regarding child kill-
ings committed by men, compare Reeder v. State, 97 So. 73, 75–77 (Ala. 1923) (affirming a
male defendant’s conviction and life sentence for the first-degree murder of his newborn
child), and State v. Pederson, 857 P.2d 658, 659 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (same), with cases
cited in supra note 14. One commentator has noted that the judicial perception of infanti-
cide, at least in England, holds that “men are bad, women are mad.” WILCZYNSKI, supra
note 12, at 117. In an English study, child-killers were determined more likely to be female.
The opposite finding was made in an Australian study. Id. at 103–04. Regardless, the nota-
ble number of female offenders of these crimes is unusual, given that women generally
commit only a small proportion of violent crimes. Id. at 104.
24. For an account of a father’s pain upon discovering his wife’s murder of their five
children, see SUZANNE O’MALLEY, ARE YOU THERE ALONE? 7 (2004).
25. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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ment of neonaticide and infanticide as instances of “murder” and
“manslaughter,” and the resulting sentencing inconsistencies. Finally,
Part III proposes legislation treating neonaticide and infanticide sepa-
rately from murder and manslaughter, considering countries that
have done so, and concluding that such an approach may effectively
redress much sentencing inconsistency in the United States.
I. Background
Before turning to the consequences of infanticide’s common cat-
egorization as either “murder” or “manslaughter,” it is helpful to first
consider the relevant terminology and the nature of the acts at issue,
as well as the important preventative efforts commonly aimed at elimi-
nating their commission. It should be noted that most of the argu-
ments surrounding neonaticide apply to infanticide with equal
force.27
A. Terminology
As explained above, although different parts of the world utilize
different definitions of infanticide,28 this Article uses the common
definition of infanticide as the killing of any infant below the age of
one.29 The killing can be deliberate, can result from the placement of
27. England’s Infanticide Act, for example, applies to mothers whose victims were
under the age of one, thus necessarily encompassing newborns. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 &
2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (U.K.). No distinction is made between neonaticide and infanticide. Id.
28. “A fundamental conceptual difficulty encountered in studying infanticide is one
of definition. The contemporary terms used, besides infanticide, include[ ] ‘willful child
murder’ and other variations. Infancy also ha[s] various legal definitions, as historically the
common law did not distinguish between murder of adults and that of newborns or adoles-
cents.” Ian C. Pilarczyk, ‘So Foul a Deed’: Infanticide in Montreal, 1825–50, 30 L. & HIST. REV.
575, 576 (2012). Black’s Law Dictionary defines infanticide, or neonaticide, as the killing
of a newborn, usually by a parent, while filicide refers generally to the murder of a new-
born child. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661, 793 (9th ed. 2009). Others, however, have used
the term “infanticide” more broadly to refer to the killing of a young child. See Elizabeth
Rapaport, Women As Perpetrators of Crime: Mad Women and Desperate Girls: Infanticide and Child
Murder in Law and Myth, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 534 (2006) (defining infanticide as the
murder of a child under the age of five by any perpetrator).
29. Pilarczyk, supra note 28, at 576 n.3. But see Brenda Barton, Comment, When Mur-
dering Hands Rock the Cradle: An Overview of America’s Incoherent Treatment of Infanticidal
Mothers, 51 SMU L. REV. 591, 593 (1998) (“Although ‘human infanticide’ has been defined
in a variety of ways, it is generally understood to mean the murder of a child under the age
of discretion. Despite the fact that the term ‘infanticide’ implies the murder of an infant,
no bright-line age rule exists. Neonaticide, the only type of infanticide that fits a bright-line
age test, defines cases where infants are murdered within twenty-four hours after birth.”
(citations omitted)). In England, the legal definition of infanticide is the killing of an
infant under the age of 12 months by his mother under specified circumstances. WILCZYN-
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the child in a dangerous situation with little hope of survival, lowered
levels of support, or high likelihood of accident, or can result from
excessive punishment.30 Several infamous infanticides have gripped
the American media, including those perpetrated by Susan Smith31
and Dr. Deborah Green.32
Neonaticide, a term coined in the 1970s by Psychiatrist Dr. Phillip
J. Resnick, describes the killing of a child within twenty-four hours of
the birth.33 There are many examples of neonaticide in the media.34
In December 1990, for example, twenty-year-old Stephanie Wernick
gave birth to a baby boy in the bathroom of a college dormitory.35
There, she asphyxiated him, then secured an unwitting friend’s help
to dispose of the body.36 A jury acquitted her of first and second-de-
gree manslaughter, but convicted her of criminally negligent homi-
cide.37 Wernick received a prison sentence of one and one-third to
four years.38 In June 1997, Melissa Drexler (later dubbed “Prom
Mom” by the media) gave birth at her high school prom, disposed of
her newborn in a restroom dustbin, then subsequently returned to the
dance.39 She was convicted of aggravated manslaughter and sen-
tenced to fifteen years in prison, but was released after serving three.40
SKI, supra note 12, at 8; see also Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (U.K.) (treat-
ing cases as infanticides where the child is under one year old).
30. Barton, supra note 29, at 594.
31. After driving her children into a lake and leaving them to drown, Susan Smith
enlisted the police’s help in locating them, claiming that they had been abducted. LINDA
RUSSELL & SHIRLEY STEPHENS, MY DAUGHTER SUSAN SMITH 11–13 (2000); see also Rick Bragg,
Focus on Susan Smith’s Lies and a Smile, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at A11. On treatment by
the media generally, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, Ethical Quandaries Created
by the Widespread Use of Legal Pundits Can Only Be Addressed by a Voluntary Code of Ethics, 22
L.A. L. 28 (2000).
32. Dr. Deborah Green, a medical doctor and homemaker, set her house on fire with
her children inside. ANN RULE, BITTER HARVEST 477 (1999). More recently, Casey Anthony
was acquitted of murdering her child. Lizette Alvarez, Casey Anthony Not Guilty in Slaying of
Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2011, at A1.
33. Resnick, supra note 8, at 1414; see also Lucy Jane Lang, Note, To Love the Babe That
Milks Me: Infanticide and Reconceiving the Mother, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 114, 132 (2005).
34. See infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
35. People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 323 (N.Y. 1996).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 322–23.
38. Barton, supra note 29, at 607 n.141.
39. Carla Koehl, Tragedy at the Prom, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1997, at 64.
40. Debbe Magnusen, From Dumpster to Delivery Room: Does Legalizing Baby Abandonment
Really Solve the Problem?, 22 J. JUV. L. 1, 2 n.7 (2002).
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These two highly publicized examples of neonaticide conform to the
common factual scenario noted by Dr. Resnick.41
There are several key differences between neonaticide and infan-
ticide. Most obviously, neonaticide necessarily occurs within twenty-
four hours of a child’s birth, while victims of infanticide are older chil-
dren.42 Also, while mothers who kill older children are frequently
psychotic, depressed, or suicidal, Dr. Resnick found that mothers who
kill their newborns usually are not.43 However, the factual consisten-
cies that often do exist between neonaticide and infanticide, i.e., com-
mission by the victim’s mother under distraught circumstances and
without intent, distinguish both from murder and manslaughter.44
The lack of legal recognition of these distinctions intensifies sentenc-
ing inconsistencies.
B. Preventive Efforts
To date, there have been many important efforts aimed at
preventing neonaticide and infanticide, though they have been unsuc-
cessful in entirely eliminating these crimes. A common focus of those
efforts has been on addressing unwanted parenthood.
The most wide-sweeping legislation to prevent neonaticide and
infanticide has been state “safe haven” laws.45 Safe haven laws allow
41. See Resnick, supra note 8, at 1415; see also Fazio & Comito, supra note 19, at 3149
(describing common characteristics of neonaticide offenders); Amy D. Wills, Comment,
Neonaticide: The Necessity of Syndrome Evidence When Safe Haven Legislation Falls Short, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 1001, 1011–12 (2004) (suggesting the possibility of a neonaticide syndrome).
42. Resnick, supra note 8, at 1414.
43. Id. at 1415. These characteristic and motivational differences led Dr. Resnick to
categorize neonaticide separately from infanticide. Megan C. Hogan, Neonaticide and the
Misuse of the Insanity Defense, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 259, 261 (1999).
44. See State v. Milke, 865 P.2d 779, 787 (Ariz. 1993) (finding the parent/child rela-
tionship as a circumstance that separates infanticide from the ‘norm’ of first-degree
murders and using that relationship in partial support of a finding of heinousness and
depravity); People v. Kirby, 194 N.W. 142, 149 (Mich. 1923) (Sharpe, J., dissenting) (“Cases
of infanticide, so far as they appear in court reports, are rare, and present questions pecu-
liar to them alone.”).
45. Today, all states have enacted safe haven laws. Susan Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens:
The Timing and Calamity of Unwanted Birth, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 227, 231 (2009);
see also Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 754 n.5 (2006). See generally, e.g., In re Jack Doe, 883 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 2009) (“Clearly, then, the intent of the Abandoned Infant Protection Act [also known
as the ‘Safe Haven Law’] to reduce the incidence of neonaticide is being advanced on two
fronts. First, there is the de facto limited ‘decriminalization’ of child abandonment when
the child is a newborn who has been brought to a designated ‘Safe Haven.’ In addition, the
public information campaign mandated by the Legislature now promotes the ‘Safe Haven’
as an option to parents who are unable to care for their newborn infants.”). The notion of
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parents to abandon, without penalty, very young children at desig-
nated public locations.46
There are common statutory limitations on such legalized paren-
tal abandonment, including that the child must be below a certain
age47 and must be left in a permissible location.48 Most states have
enacted safe haven laws in such a way as to curb out-of-state abandon-
ment of children, so that no one state is overwhelmed with another’s
abandoned children.49 Although safe haven laws have been unsuccess-
ful at eliminating neonaticide and infanticide completely,50 they en-
courage the reduced occurrence of both51 and might prove even
more effective if better advertised.52
Other attempts to reduce neonaticide and infanticide aim at ret-
roactively reviewing various governmental agencies’ interactions with
the mothers who passed through their systems before killing their
young children.53 By “reviewing the past to prevent in the future,”54
legalized infant abandonment is not new. See Dannelli v. Dannelli’s Adm’r, 67 Ky. (4 Bush)
51, 54–55 (Ky. 1868).
46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-10A-4 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-22-3(A) (2012).
47. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-417(2) (2011) (requiring that child be under 30
days old when surrendered).
48. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-34-202(a) (2012) (requiring that child be left with a
medical provider or law enforcement agency); MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)(a) (2012) (re-
quiring that child be left with a licensed hospital, health care provider, or ambulance
service).
49. Lucinda J. Cornett, Note, Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition
of “Safe Haven” and Looking Beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 KY. L.J. 833, 849 (2010);
Jessica Valenti, Not Wanting Kids Is Entirely Normal, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/not-wanting-kids-is-entirely-normal/
262367 (explaining that a rewrite of Nebraska’s original safe harbor law was necessary, in
part, to prevent those outside the state from bringing their children into Nebraska to se-
cure safe harbor services).
50. Jennifer R. Racine, A Dangerous Place for Society and Its Troubled Young Women: A Call
for an End to Newborn Safe Haven Laws in Wisconsin and Beyond, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 243,
251 (“[R]eckless abandonment and neonaticide continue to occur at a steady rate today
despite the enactment of safe haven laws.”).
51. Cornett, supra note 49, at 838 (“The legislative message is clear: we promise not to
prosecute you if you promise not to leave your baby where it will likely die.”). A French
study similarly suggests that safe haven laws provide an alternative to neonaticide and in-
fanticide. Catherine Bonnet, Adoption at Birth: Prevention Against Abandonment or Neonaticide,
17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 501 (1993) (reporting the results of a 1980’s study in France
wherein 22 female subjects were interviewed to understand the psychodynamics of giving
up one’s child—18 of the subjects took advantage of the French law permitting anonymous
and cost-free delivery, then the adoption of the baby; four were shocked by the birth and
committed neonaticide).
52. Ayres, supra note 45, at 271–77; see also Stacie Schmerling Perez, Combating the
“Baby Dumping” Epidemic: A Look at Florida’s Safe Haven Law, 33 NOVA L. REV. 245, 267
(2008).
53. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 185–91.
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Child Death Review Teams (“CDRT”) identify the victims and causes
of infanticides after they happen, in order to improve agencies’ future
prevention efforts when encountering at-risk mothers.55 Dr. Wilczyn-
ski, in her study discussed above, supports this type of review for im-
proving agencies’ interactions with at-risk mothers.56
It has been suggested that, in order to be successful, preventative
measures must be tailored to the contributing causes of infanticide.57
For example, preventative measures may include redressing the dis-
proportionate parenting responsibilities placed on women, “since wo-
men tend to kill in a context of having too much responsibility for
child-care and men in a context of not having enough.”58 In her
study, Dr. Wilczynski suggests increasing societal support for families59
and those who are mentally ill.60 All of these tools would help certain
mothers in difficult situations, perhaps preventing their commission
of neonaticide or infanticide.61
However, preventative measures targeting neonaticide and infan-
ticide are difficult to construct for several reasons. First, the psycho-
logical issues associated with these crimes are not easily identifiable
before the infanticide or neonaticide occurs. For example, many wo-
men who commit neonaticide are in denial about their pregnancy in
the first place.62 Second, even those parents who do not commit infan-
ticide or neonaticide may manifest filicidal characteristics.63 Nonethe-
less, if particular preventative measures reduce the occurrence of
neonaticide and infanticide, they should be pursued.
54. Id. at 185.
55. See id. at 185–91.
56. Id. at 191 (“Such teams represent a vital step towards the prevention of child
fatalities.”).
57. Id. at 215 (“Preventative measures . . . must be designed to address [ ] the multiple
causes of child-killing. . . .”).
58. Id.
59. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 216–20.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 49–52.
63. Susan Hatters-Friedman & Phillip J. Resnick, Parents Who Kill, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES
(May 11, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/1412694?page
Number=2.
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II. Current Treatment by Courts
In the United States, neither neonaticide nor infanticide consti-
tutes a separate offence from homicide.64 Lack of statutory separation
has produced widely inconsistent charging in neonaticide and infanti-
cide cases, ranging from unlawful disposition of a body to first-degree
murder.65
Neonaticides and infanticides are typically charged under state
murder and manslaughter statutes.66 For example, in one sample of
forty-two defendants in neonaticide cases, twenty-nine were charged
with murder.67 In another sample of eight neonaticide cases, one de-
fendant was convicted of first-degree murder, two of second-degree
murder, three of involuntary manslaughter, one of negligent homi-
cide, and one for “unspecified” murder.68 This frequent treatment of
neonaticide and infanticide as either murder or manslaughter merits
further review at the state level, as well as the federal level given the
occasional federal jurisdiction in such cases.
A. Treatment in State Courts
Criminal law traditionally falls within the domain of the states,69
placing the vast majority of neonaticide and infanticide cases in state
courts. To varying extents, many states have adopted the Model Penal
Code, developed by the American Law Institute, which grades homi-
64. United States v. Gibson, 17 C.M.R. 911, 934 (A.F.B.R. 1954); see also Diane Fan-
ning, Neonaticide: A Distinct Crime or Just Another Murder?, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/crime/2011/11/22/neonaticide-a-distinct-crime-or-just-another-
murder/ (“All these cases in the U.S. have been approached as homicides from the onset
because there are no specific neonaticide or infanticide laws here.”).
65. Oberman, supra note 8, at 31. One Chicago defense lawyer also noted a pattern of
“over-charging and under-convicting” in neonaticide cases. Id. at 96 (quoting an interview
with Jeffrey Urdangen, criminal defense attorney, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 15, 1995)).
66. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594, 607 (Ga. 1860) (noting that infanticide “is clear
murder”); Commonwealth v. Hall, 78 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Mass. 1948) (quoting R. v. Hughes,
(1857) 7 Cox C.C. 301, 302) (“But it has never been doubted that if death is the direct
consequence of the malicious omission of the performance of a duty (as of a mother to
nourish her infant child) this is a case of murder. If the omission was not malicious and
arose from negligence only, it is a case of manslaughter.”); State v. Collington, 192 S.E.2d
857 (S.C. 1972) (mother charged with murder for committing neonaticide); State v. Mc-
Guire, 490 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va. 1997) (neonaticidal defendant charged with murder).
But see State v. DePiano, 926 P.2d 494, 495–96 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (attempted killing of
a child charged as two counts of intentional or knowing child abuse, which carries a much
stiffer sentence).
67. Oberman, supra note 8, at 31.
68. Macfarlane, supra note 1, at 194.
69. See Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 119, 119
(2005).
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cide offenses according to state of mind.70 Similarly, the common law
underlying many other state criminal codes defines murder as the un-
lawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought.71
Modern state statutes generally provide distinctions between first and
second-degree murder,72 with first-degree murder typically codified as
a killing committed either with premeditation or during an enumer-
ated felony,73 and second-degree murder being all others.74
Some commentators have noted that when neonaticides and in-
fanticides are charged as murder, they often fail to meet all of the
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 (1962) (explanatory note). A homicidal killing con-
stitutes murder when “committed purposely or knowingly,” or when “committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,” id.
§ 210.2(1)(a)–(b). Manslaughter is a killing “committed recklessly” or “under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explana-
tion or excuse.” Id. § 210.3. Negligent homicide is a killing “committed negligently.” Id.
§ 210.4. The Code’s comments have suggested an awareness of the unique nature of ne-
onaticide that may make those cases better suited to manslaughter rather than murder
charges:
[W]e think it plain that the case for a mitigated sentence does not depend on a
distinction between impulse and deliberation; the very fact of long internal strug-
gle may be evidence that the actor’s homicidal impulse was deeply aberrational,
far more the product of extraordinary circumstances than a true reflection of the
actor’s normal character, as, for example, in the case of . . . many infanticides . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. at 70 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). However, this comment
was included only in a 1959 tentative draft of the Model Penal Code and does not appear
in later editions. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
71. Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts Murder Statute, 10 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 206 (2001). In other words, with the intent to kill, inflict great bodily
harm, commit a felony, or act with knowledge of probable death or grievous bodily harm.
Id. at 208.
72. Id. at 253; see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003.
73. Kealy, supra note 71, at 253.
74. Id. at 253. In one case of neonaticide, the court offered this distinction between
first- and second-degree murder:
If the defendant, with a sedate and deliberate mind, anterior or subsequent to the
act of parturition conceived the design to take the life of her new-born infant,
and in pursuance of such formed design did take its life in the manner alleged in
the indictment, and such infant was wholly produced from the body of its mother
alive, and was in existence by actual birth at the time the injuries causing death
were inflicted, then she would be guilty of murder with express malice. If, how-
ever, the design to take its life was formed and executed when her mind, by rea-
son of physical or mental anguish, was incapable of cool reflection, and she was
not sufficiently self-possessed to consider and contemplate the consequences
about to be done, but, yielding to a sudden, rash impulse, she conceived and
perpetrated the fatal deed after the infant had been wholly produced from her
body and had an existence by actual birth, then she was guilty of murder in the
second degree.
Wallace v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 570, 572 (Tx. Ct. App. 1880).
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statutory elements of the murder charge.75 For example, intent may
be hard to prove given the impulsive nature of these killings. Another
common challenge in charging neonaticide cases as murder is prov-
ing that the victim was born alive.76 This requirement, not at issue in
murder cases generally, is specifically necessary in the instance of a
neonaticide because stillborn births occasionally occur and “one can-
not kill [someone] already dead.”77 Accordingly, for both of the above
reasons, murder convictions for neonaticides and infanticides have
been reversed on insufficiency of evidence grounds.78
Common law legal defenses have not consistently disposed of
these cases in state courts.79 Nonetheless, the defense of insanity,80
75. Oberman, supra note 8, at 95.
76. As in any other murder case, this element must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., Shedd v. State, 173 S.E. 847, 847–49 (Ga. 1934) (finding insufficient evi-
dence to establish that the child was born alive and discussing corpus delicti in infanticide
cases generally); State v. Collington, 192 S.E.2d 856, 857–58 (S.C. 1972) (finding sufficient
evidence to establish that the child was born alive and discussing corpus deliciti in infanti-
cide cases generally). For more background on the concept of corpus delicti, see State v.
Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 218–19 (Wash. 1996) (“‘Corpus delicti’ literally means ‘body of the
crime.’ In a homicide case, the corpus delicti consists of two elements the State must prove
at trial: (1) the fact of death and (2) a causal connection between the death and a criminal
act. The corpus delicti can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence.”).
77. Singleton v. State, 35 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948). To establish a live birth,
“[r]ough and rule of thumb tests were applied by the earlier cases, and the question of the
viability of the child seems to have revolved around whether the child breathed and had a
circulation independent of its mother.” Id.; see also Catherine L. Goldenberg, Comment,
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28
SW. U. L. REV. 599, 611–12 (noting the difficulty of determining foul play in cases where
the child might have instead died from sudden infant death syndrome). Finally, it is well-
established that evidence of previous instances of infanticide or child abuse are admissible
in court to establish intent and an absence of mistake or accident. See, e.g., United States v.
Harris, 661 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133 (4th
Cir. 1973); State v. Hassett, 859 P.2d 955, 964 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
78. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 35 So. 2d 375, 381 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948); Weaver v. State,
132 So. 706, 708 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931); Denham v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 384, 384 (Ky.
1931); State v. Voges, 266 N.W. 265, 266 (Minn. 1936); Taylor v. State, 66 So. 321, 321
(Miss. 1914); Brown v. State, 49 So. 146, 147 (Miss. 1909); Josef v. State, 30 S.W. 1067,
1068–69 (Tx. Crim. App. 1895); State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1016–18 (Utah 1938);
State v. Merrill, 78 S.E. 699, 702 (W. Va. 1913); State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469, 484 (Wyo.
1954). But see State v. Shephard, 124 N.W.2d 712, 722 (Iowa 1963).
79. See supra note 14.
80. Depending on the jurisdiction, one of several tests determines whether a defen-
dant may use an insanity defense at trial. Most states utilize the M’Naughten standard. Adam
Caine, Comment, Fallen From Grace: Why Treatment Should Be Considered for Convicted Combat
Veterans Suffering From Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 UMKC L. REV. 215, 222 (2009).
M’Naughten permits acquittal by reason of insanity when the defendant, during the com-
mission of the crime, either did not know the nature and quality of her act or did not know
the act was wrong. Shannon Farley, Comment, Neonaticide: When the Bough Breaks and the
Cradle Falls, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 597, 610 (2004). See also, e.g., Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027,
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which entitles a defendant to an acquittal, has been used frequently
and successfully.81 One study of infanticide cases revealed that one-
third of the cases studied had successfully argued an insanity defense,
versus the less than one percent successfully argued in all felony
cases.82 The success rate of insanity defenses in infanticide cases de-
creased, however, following the infanticide committed by Susan
Smith, who was reviled for pursuing an insanity defense by a public
who already found her unsympathetic.83 Nonetheless, defendants con-
tinue to raise insanity defenses in many infanticides84 despite their
mixed success.85
Postpartum depression plays an important role in many insanity
defenses against murder charges following the killing of a child by his
or her mother. Postpartum depression is a reactive depression involv-
ing feelings of hopelessness, inadequacy, anxiety, and moodiness that
affects ten to twenty percent of women after giving birth, sometimes
for as long as a year.86 Evidence shows that the amount of support that
a mother receives from her family “may be more determinative of
[who develops postpartum] depression than are demographic and bi-
ological factors.”87
1029 (Nev. 1979). Another test for insanity is the American Law Institute Test, which ac-
quits a defendant if she can show that she “lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality . . . of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.”
Farley, supra note 80, at 610. For an example of the use of the American Law Institute Test
in an infanticide case, see State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 800 (Idaho 1969).
81. See, e.g., State v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d 473, 475–76 (Ill. 1951) (prosecution unable to
satisfy burden of proof required to rebut defendant’s claim of insanity); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 435 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (noting that appellant had been found
not guilty of murder at trial by reason of insanity). Judge Cardozo supported the insanity
defense for infanticide when he wrote,
A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly attached. She
knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows that the law condemns it; but
she is inspired by an insane delusion that God has appeared to her and ordained
the sacrifice. It seems a mockery to say that, within the meaning of the statute, she
knows that the act is wrong.
People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915).
82. Perlin, supra note 1, at 28–29.
83. Id. at 29.
84. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Temporary Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the Perfect
Defense, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2011).
85. For an example of the difficulty of facilitating psychological defenses for infan-
ticidal mothers, see Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1103–04 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004).
86. Michele Connell, Note, The Postpartum Psychosis Defense and Feminism: More or Less
Justice for Women?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2002).
87. Id. at 146.
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Although commonly employed in developing an insanity de-
fense,88 “[e]vidence of postpartum disorders can [also] be used to de-
termine competency to stand trial, to challenge the voluntary act
requirement of a criminal offense, to negate the mental state for the
crime charged, to establish manslaughter . . . and to determine the
appropriate sentence.”89 However, the admissibility of evidence of a
defendant’s postpartum depression—even its more serious form, post-
partum psychosis90—has not resolved sentencing inconsistency in
these cases. For example, in a study of twenty-four cases employing
postpartum psychosis as a defense, eight women were acquitted, eight
received probation, ten were sentenced to between three and twenty
years of imprisonment, and two received life sentences.91 This wide
range of sentences is stark.
Commentators have also called for the legal recognition of Ne-
onaticide Syndrome,92 which would allow expert witnesses to testify
about the universal characteristics of neonaticide in court in support
of a defense theory.93 Although state courts have often declined to
recognize this syndrome,94 one dissent argued that its admissibility
should be considered, and urged the use of the Frye test to determine
whether courts should allow testimony on the syndrome to clarify the
defendant’s capacity to know and appreciate the nature and conse-
quences of her conduct at the time she killed her newborn.95
88. Laura E. Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal In-
fanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699, 738 (1991); see also State v. Young, No. 9904019648, 2003
WL 1847262, at *2–3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2003) (noting the availability of the defense
of postpartum psychosis); Anne Damante Brusca, Note, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for
Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1149–69 (1990).
89. Reece, supra note 88, at 717. See generally id. at 717–47.
90. Lang, supra note 33, at 136. (“Approximately only one in one thousand women
suffering from postpartum depression develops postpartum psychosis, and one out of every
twenty women suffering from postpartum psychosis tries to kill herself or her children.”).
91. Daniel Maier Katkin, Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide, and Criminal Justice, in POST-
PARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS 279–80 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel
Harberger eds., 1992).
92. Judith E. Macfarlane, for one, has rigorously argued for the recognition of such a
syndrome. See Macfarlane, supra note 1, at 180. But see infra note 95.
93. Macfarlane, supra note 1, at 181.
94. Molly Karlin, Damned If She Does, Damned If She Doesn’t: De-Legitimization of Women’s
Agency, in Commonwealth v. Woodward, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125, 159 (2008) (not-
ing that no court “has accepted neonaticide syndrome as a basis for an affirmative
defense”).
95. People v. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (Friedmann, J.,
dissenting), aff’d 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996). The Frye test probes whether the reliability of
scientific evidence derived from a novel procedure is generally accepted by those in a
position to know. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d at 326–27 (Simons, J., dissenting). Not all psychia-
trists, however, support the legal recognition of Neonaticide Syndrome. See, e.g., Phillip J.
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Finally, commentators have noted the partial defense of the
Model Penal Code’s Extreme Mental and Emotional Disturbance
(“EMED”) doctrine’s applicability to neonaticide and infanticide
cases, on the theory that mental or emotional disturbance contributes
to these cases.96 EMED essentially reduces murder to manslaughter
when there exists a reasonable excuse for a mental or emotional dis-
turbance that contributed to the killing.97 The Model Penal Code’s
standard for extreme mental or emotional disturbance is more flexi-
ble than that of traditional provocation, thereby being more defen-
dant-friendly.98
All of these defenses have been inconsistently recognized in cases
involving neonaticide and infanticide.99 While some defenses are rec-
ognized, others are not, and the lack of a consistent approach to these
defenses contributes to the inconsistencies encountered in such cases.
B. Treatment in Federal Courts
Charging inconsistencies exasperate sentencing inconsistencies
on both interstate and intrastate levels.100 Although criminal law falls
within the domain of the states, criminal cases are occasionally tried in
Resnick & Susan Hatters-Friedman, Book Review, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1172 (2003)
(reviewing INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL
(Margaret G. Spinelli ed., 2003)) (“Macfarlane also argues for the unsubstantiated ‘ne-
onaticide syndrome,’ which thus far the courts have wisely rejected. No act alone should be
allowed to define an illness. For example, ‘homicidal insanity,’ a form of ‘moral insanity,’
was a defense in the 1800s. It was ultimately rejected as having no valid scientific basis.”
(citations omitted)).
96. See, e.g., Janet Ford, Note, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal Mothers—In Search of the
Punishment That Fits the Crime, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 521, 532 (1996); Reece, supra note
88, at 731–32. The reason for applying EMED to neonaticide and infanticide may be simi-
lar to the reasoning driving England’s Infanticide Act, which “presumes that all women are
ill if they kill their infants within the first twelve months of life.” Barton, supra note 29, at
596. See also supra note 79.
97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980). Specifically, murder is manslaughter by
defense of EMED when a homicide “is committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The rea-
sonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.” Id.
98. Reece, supra note 88, at 731.
99. See, e.g., Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the In-
sanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 713, 742 (2003).
100. See, e.g., Deegan I, 605 F.3d 625, 637 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, J., dissenting)
(“[N]eonaticide does not now, nor has it ever, come within the ‘run-of-the-mine’ guide-
lines for second-degree murder.”). For an argument that federal sentencing should be
more consistent with state sentencing, see Barkow, supra note 69, at 136.
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federal courts.101 These federal cases have their own set of sentencing
inconsistency issues arising from the application of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
There is no federal infanticide statute for murder, just as there is
none in state court. Therefore, defendants must be charged pursuant
to either the federal murder statute,102 the federal manslaughter stat-
ute,103 or some other miscellaneous criminal federal statute. Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1111,104 the federal murder statute, in order to
“enlarge the common law definition of murder.”105 Included in this
definition is the killing of a fetus.106
Federal murder is classified into differing degrees. Murder in the
first-degree includes “every murder perpetrated by . . . any [ ] kind of
willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing . . . .”107 Under
federal law, all other murders are those in the second degree.108 Ac-
cordingly, premeditation is the distinguishing element between first-
degree and second-degree murder.109 There is some uncertainty in
federal courts, however, about the precise legal definition of premedi-
tation.110 Nonetheless, to support premeditation (and thus a charge
of first-degree murder), federal courts generally require a showing
101. For example, neonaticides and infanticides are tried on the federal level if the
killing was committed on an Indian Reservation, as in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
case of United States v. Deegan. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see also, e.g., Deegan I, 605 F.3d at
625.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
103. Id. § 1112(a).
104. Id. § 1111.
105. United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting SPECIAL
JOINT COMM. ON THE REVISION OF THE LAWS, REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE LAWS, ETC.,
H.R. REP. NO. 2, at 25 (1st Sess. 1908)).
106. Id.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). In its entirety, the statute defines first-degree murder as:
[E]very murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, es-
pionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary,
or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture
against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully
and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is
killed.
Id.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Begay, 567 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Premeditation is the
essential element that distinguishes first-degree from second-degree murder.”).
110. United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 393 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.7(a) at 477 (2d ed. 2003) (“It is not easy to give a
meaningful definition of the word[ ] ‘premeditate’ . . . as . . . used in connection with first
degree murder.”).
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that the defendant acted with “a ‘cool mind’ that is capable of reflec-
tion, and . . . did, in fact, reflect, at least for a short period of time
before his act of killing.”111 Federal manslaughter is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being without malice aforethought,112 and is either
voluntary113 or involuntary.114
Congress has promulgated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
order to achieve sentencing consistency in federal criminal cases.115
The Guidelines consist of sentencing ranges that are “the product of
careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the
review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”116 In other
words, the Guidelines were generated using statistics analyzing actual
sentences that district court judges ordered for particular crimes.
Given their rarity, federal neonaticide and infanticide cases could
not have influenced the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for murder in
any meaningful way.117 In fact, federal neonaticide and infanticide
111. Shaw, 701 F.2d at 393.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). Malice aforethought essentially means having an intent to
kill, an intent to inflict great bodily harm, an intent to commit a felony, or awareness of a
high risk of death. Kealy, supra note 71, at 206–08.
113. In other words, manslaughter committed “[u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
114. Manslaughter perpetrated while “[i]n the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due cau-
tion and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.” Id.
115. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20 (2003); see also S.
REP. NO. 98-225, at 38–39 (1983).
116. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). However, not all of the Guideline
sentences are derived using this empirical approach, including the sentences recom-
mended for drug offenses. See, e.g., Whitman Knapp, The War on Drugs, 5 FED. SENT’G REP.
294, 295 (1993); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legit-
imate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 632–33 (2006). Importantly, “the Sentenc-
ing Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines range
for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory mini-
mum sentences that Congress established for such crimes.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 n.2. Also
not empirically founded, the death penalty was made available for gun murders committed
during federal drug trafficking crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5), as well as during “drive-by
shooting[s],” id. § 36. The Sentencing Commission is also particularly tough on child por-
nography. See, e.g., Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The
Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 83, 83–84 (2008).
117. United States v. Deegan (Deegan II), 634 F.3d 428, 428 (8th Cir. 2010) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he fact [is] that the United States Sen-
tencing Commission has generally had a large database of previous offenses to consider in
formulating guidelines. In this case . . . that may not have been true for the offense of
neonaticide despite the assurances given to the district court before it imposed
sentence.”).
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cases necessarily fall outside the “heartland”118 of murders contem-
plated by the Sentencing Guidelines and tried in federal courts be-
cause they are simply too few. The significance of this has indeed
decreased from the past, when imposition of the Sentencing Guide-
lines was mandatory and departures were only permitted in cases that
were determined to fall outside the heartland.119 In United States v.
Booker,120 however, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), the federal statute making the Sentencing Guidelines
mandatory, was inconsistent with the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment.121 Therefore, the section was severed from the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984, making the Sentencing Guidelines entirely
discretionary, and reducing the importance of whether a case falls
within the heartland of the Guidelines.122 Nonetheless, district courts
today still must “give serious consideration to the extent of any depar-
ture from the Guidelines . . . .”123
This is problematic because neonaticide and infanticide defend-
ants likely receive different penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines
than they would have received had the Sentencing Guidelines con-
templated the unique facts of their cases. If, for this reason, a judge
departs from the Sentencing Guidelines in such cases, sentencing in-
consistencies will still remain, due to lack of statutory guidance.
In sum, the legal approach to neonaticide and infanticide cases is
hardly uniform on either the state or federal level. Prosecutors bring
varying charges against these defendants, defendants use differing de-
fense strategies, and as a result, courts impose disparate sentences.
118. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1490 (2004) (explaining that a
“heartland” of like cases was established by the Sentencing Commission for determining
sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
119. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996). Until 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
permitted deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines only if the sentencing court found
“an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
120. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
121. Id. at 226–27.
122. Id. at 245.
123. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that district courts have a unique vantage point to best determine whether or not a
case properly falls within the heartland of the Guidelines. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98–99. The
courts of appeals, however, do retain the power to review district court sentencing deci-
sions for reasonableness. D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion
and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 641, 650 (2011).
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III. Sentencing Consistency Offered by Separate Neonaticide
and Infanticide Legislation
Several proposals have been made to consistently resolve neonati-
cide and infanticide cases in the courts,124 without much success.125 As
a means of reform, this article proposes statutorily separating neonati-
cide and infanticide from other crimes. Regardless of whether the pol-
icy of such reform eventually aims to achieve greater leniency or
harshness for offenders, statutory separation would be the most effec-
tive method for achieving consistent administration of justice within
this subset of criminal law.
A. Model Infanticide Legislation in England
Many countries have separate infanticide statutes.126 England’s
Infanticide Act127 serves as the quintessential example of such legisla-
tion, although Canada,128 New Zealand,129 and some states of Austra-
lia,130 for example, have also enacted similar legislation.
Many organizations in jurisdictions with infanticide statutes have
analyzed whether infanticide legislation should be repealed,
amended, or retained.131 Following those evaluations, separate infan-
124. See supra Part II.A (describing proposals for the judicial acceptance of Neonaticide
Syndrome, insanity defenses, and the Model Penal Code’s Extreme Mental and Emotional
Disturbance (“EMED”) doctrine).
125. Id.
126. Oberman, supra note 8, at 24 (“The infanticide statutes from around the world
evidence a shared sense that it is both legally and morally wrong for a mother to kill her
infant. At the same time, they evince an equally powerful consensus that, both in terms of
its genesis and in terms of maternal culpability, infanticide is a far different crime from
other homicides.”).
127. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (U.K.).
128. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 233 (Can.). The Canadian infanticide stat-
ute was based on England’s legislation. It states:
A female person commits infanticide when by a wilful act or omission she causes
the death of her newly-born child, if at the time of the act or omission she is not
fully recovered from the effects of giving birth to the child and by reason thereof
or of the effect of lactation consequent on the birth of the child her mind is then
disturbed.
Id. For more background on Canada’s statute, see April J. Walker, Application of the Insanity
Defense to Postpartum Disorder-Driven Infanticide in the United States: A Look Toward the Enact-
ment of an Infanticide Act, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 197, 205–07
(2006).
129. Crimes Act 1961, § 178 (N.Z.).
130. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 151 n.4; see also, e.g., N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N,
PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER: PROVOCATION AND INFANTICIDE (REPORT 83) (1997), availa-
ble at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R83CHP3.
131. These have included the 1993 NSW Law Reform Commission in Australia, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada, the 1984 Criminal Law Revision Committee in En-
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ticide statutes were retained by each country evaluated.132 The Crimi-
nal Law Revision Committee in England even supported expanding
the scope of England’s Infanticide Act to include killings that result
from a mental disturbance arising from “circumstances consequent
upon the birth,” such as “environmental and other stresses.”133 The
Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Working Party on Infanticide con-
curred, also finding that the Act’s scope should be expanded.134 The
success of these statutes abroad supports the advisability of their intro-
duction in the United States.
Interest in initial infanticide legislation in England arose in the
late Eighteenth Century,135 due to the frequent refusal by juries to
convict women of murder for acts of infanticide on account of the
mandatory death sentence accompanying murder.136 Instead, juries
preferred the much lesser charge of concealment of birth.137 This was
especially true when defendants were servants, seduced or raped by
their masters or their masters’ associates.138 Even when a woman was
convicted of murder, the sentence was often commuted,139 undermin-
ing England’s justice system.
The Infanticide Act of 1922140 was eventually enacted in England.
The Act separated the offense of infanticide from murder, reducing it
to the level of manslaughter.141 It applied when a woman caused the
death of her newborn by any willful act or omission, if “at the time of
the act or omission she had not fully recovered from the effect of
giving birth to such child, [and] by reason thereof the balance of her
gland, and the House of Lords Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment in
England. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 155.
132. Id.
133. Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, CRIM. L. REV. 259, 263
(1984).
134. Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCH.
PUB. POL. & L. 1098, 1108 (2000). The Law Reform Commission of Canada, however,
determined that the underlying rationale of the Infanticide Act was redundant, and con-
cluded that the codification of infanticide as a separate legal entity should be abolished. Id.
135. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 150. For a history of infanticide in England, see
Rapaport, supra note 28, at 547–57.
136. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 150.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18 (U.K.).
141. Id.
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mind was then disturbed.”142 The hormonal shifts that occur after the
delivery of a child were cited as the Act’s underlying justification.143
However, the scope of the Act was initially unclear. After its enact-
ment, two subsequent English cases144 held that the Infanticide Act
did not apply to infants aged thirty-five days and three weeks, respec-
tively.145 The Infanticide Act of 1938146 was therefore enacted to
amend the 1922 Act by widening the scope of infanticide under the
Act by including only newly born children to those less than twelve
months of age.147 The justification for this expansion was to recognize
the woman’s disturbed balance of mind due to “the effect of lactation”
following childbirth.148
The Infanticide Act of 1938 is still in force in England and Wales
today. It states:
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of
her child . . . under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the
act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of
her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the
child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the
birth of the child . . . she shall be guilty . . . of infanticide, and may
for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been
guilty of the offence manslaughter of the child.149
While jurisdictions with infanticide legislation, including En-
gland, do not always convict defendants under those statutes,150 infan-
ticide acts remain a standardized method by which to resolve
infanticide cases. In one sample of thirteen English infanticide cases,
for example, although only two women were initially charged with in-
fanticide, all thirteen were ultimately convicted under the Infanticide
Act.151 Of those ultimately convicted under the Act, three were ini-
tially charged with murder because of either an absence of evidence
supporting infanticide or a positive statement by the woman’s doctor
that the infanticide charge was not supportable.152 Often, psychiatric
142. O’Donovan, supra note 133, at 261. For further background on the English infan-
ticide legislation, see Gardner, supra note 11, at 985–88.
143. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1.
144. R. v. O’Donaghue, (1924) 20 Cr. App. R. 132; R. v. Hale, The Times, 22 July 1936.
145. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 151.
146. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1.
150. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 151.
151. Id. However, one Australian study found that slightly more infanticidal women
were convicted of manslaughter than infanticide. Id. at 152.
152. Id. at 151.
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reports given in these cases resulted in convictions for infanticide in-
stead of murder.153 Therefore, the availability of the Infanticide Act
guided the sentencing in most of these cases as if the defendants had
committed manslaughter, thus rectifying the prior problem of jury
nullification that had been undermining the justice system, while si-
multaneously producing more consistent sentences.
A separate but related point concerns deterrence. One of the
most important purposes of criminal punishment is deterrence, which
is not effectively accomplished by charging and sentencing these de-
fendants under murder and manslaughter statutes.154 While deter-
rence is typically achieved by criminal laws that impose punitive
sanctions compelling people to obey the law,155 women gripped by
psychosis or social pressures regarding motherhood will not react to
traditional deterrence efforts.156
In terms of producing sentencing consistency, women’s sentences
have been relatively consistent under English infanticide legislation.
Initially, there was “an even split between custodial and non-custodial
disposals, to the almost total abandonment of prison sentences by the
late 1950s.”157 Now, women convicted of infanticide in England usu-
ally receive probation orders, commonly with psychiatric treatments
attached.158 In one sample of cases disposed of under the Act, four
women received probation orders, four women received probation or-
ders including psychiatric treatment, one received a supervision or-
der, and two received unrestricted hospital orders.159 These even
numbers reflect the general sentencing patterns for infanticide de-
fendants not only in England, but also in Hong Kong and Australia,160
153. Id.
154. See James J. Dvorak, Comment, Neonaticide: Less Than Murder?, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
173, 189 (1998) (“The presumption of a disturbed state of mind in infanticide acts easily
leads to rehabilitation as a proper form of punishment. This presumption also appears to
lead to the conclusion that deterrence by imprisonment is not applicable.”); Jose
Gabilondo, Irrational Exuberance About Babies: The Taste for Heterosexuality and Its Conspicuous
Reproduction, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 68 (2008) (“Deterrence based on legal punish-
ment fails since infanticide tends to be ‘a spontaneous crime, reflecting a loss of control
rather than a cool-headed calculation.’” (quoting Oberman, supra note 8, at 14)).
155. Cheryl L. Evans, The Case for More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability: Where Do We
Go From Here?, 41 STETSON L. REV. 21, 26 (2011) (“One of the basic tenets of criminal law is
deterrence. Criminal law exists, in part, to deter bad behavior.”).
156. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
157. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 154.
160. Id.
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which have also enacted infanticide legislation.161 The Infanticide Act
in England serves as a model for separate infanticide legislation and
offers the promise of achieving sentencing consistency for neonaticide
and infanticide cases in the United States.
B. Drafting Infanticide Legislation for the United States
While the exact sentencing structure of a potential infanticide
statute in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article, the
English statute, as well as other international models, is nonetheless
instructive. Drafting separate infanticide legislation—both at the state
and federal level—raises several legal and policy issues, including
questions regarding the appropriate scope of such a statute, the legal
basis for such legislation, and debate as to its necessity.
Foreign infanticide statutes often apply only to maternal perpe-
trators, and are justified by the physical and emotional consequences
associated with giving birth and nursing.162 However, some commen-
tators have expressed sociological concerns about focusing on the
emotional factors associated with giving birth. They aver that such a
focus may arguably create excuses for women who commit homicide
and undermine women generally by suggesting they are unstable and
hormonal.163 There is also the problem of portraying women as
psychotic and irrational.164 On the other hand, as was done in foreign
jurisdictions, these social costs must be weighed against achieving the
fair and consistent administration of justice.165 The proposed Ameri-
can infanticide legislation need not, for these reasons, rest on medical
reasons alone, but instead on the sentencing inconsistencies resolved
by such separate legislation.
161. Wills, supra note 41, at 1001; see also supra Part III.A.
162. See supra Part III.A.
163. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 226; Abigail Wong, Filicide and Mothers Who Suffer
From Postpartum Mental Disorders, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 571, 587–88 (2006). One article
expresses concern regarding the leniency a woman might be afforded in the military crimi-
nal justice system because of her monthly menstrual cycle. Michael J. Davidson, Feminine
Hormonal Defenses: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis, ARMY LAW., July 2000, at 5,
13–17. American courts have generally disfavored menstrual-related defenses. Brusca,
supra note 88, at 1135 n.7.
164. See, e.g., Christine M. Belew, Comment, Killing One’s Abuser: Premeditation, Pathol-
ogy, or Provocation?, 59 EMORY L.J. 769, 807 (2010) (noting that one outcome of accommo-
dations for women who kill their abusers has been that battered women are portrayed as
irrational and dysfunctional).
165. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 22.
Winter 2013] SENTENCING CONSISTENCY 483
Another common criticism of separate infanticide legislation
targets the medical assumptions underlying such legislation166 and
asks whether the mental disturbance in infanticide cases is, in fact,
caused by childbirth or lactation.167 Critics may point to findings by
the American Psychological Association, which—after denying any
link between childbearing and psychological illness for the first three
editions of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM”) manual for doctors168—currently limits its acknowledgement
of the risk of infanticide from postpartum depression to the onset of
symptoms within four weeks of birth.169 Furthermore, studies of ma-
ternal infanticides suggest various motives, only some of which are re-
lated to medical causes, such as postpartum psychosis and
depression.170 For example, some commentators have pointed to the
external, situational pressures unique to motherhood.171
However, an American infanticide statute need not rest on medi-
cal justifications.172 It can be established on legal constructs alone. In
California, for example, a showing of heat of passion supports down-
grading murder charges to voluntary manslaughter.173 Such a legally-
constructed classification can be similarly established in cases of ne-
onaticide and infanticide by virtue of separating them from other kill-
166. See, e.g., id. at 226 (“The infanticide legislation is distasteful at an ideological level
since it is . . . based on a lesser degree of mental disturbance than that recognised else-
where in criminal law.”).
167. See Kirsten Johnson Kramar & William D. Watson, Canadian Infanticide Legislation,
1948 and 1955: Reflections on the Medicalization/Autopoiesis Debate, 33 CAN. J. SOC. 237, 239
(2008) (“[T]he biological theory . . . that women in childbirth, especially in difficult cir-
cumstances, were prone to temporarily lose reason or self-control, was a lay, rather than a
psychiatric, theory.” (citation omitted)).
168. Davidson, supra note 163, at 10.
169. Sara Anthis, Postpartum Depression and New York’s Child Welfare Policy in Neglect Cases,
12 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 33, 34 (2004); see also Davidson, supra note 163, at 5; Spinelli, supra
note 2 (explaining that “[c]ontemporary neuroscientific findings support the position that
a woman with postpartum psychosis who commits infanticide needs treatment rather than
punishment and that appropriate treatment will deter her from killing again” and conclud-
ing that “absence of formal DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for postpartum psychiatric disorders
promotes disparate treatment under the law.”).
170. See, e.g., supra Part II.A; Dobson & Sales, supra note 134, at 1109.
171. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 84, at 1634.
172. But see WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 150 (quoting J.A. Osborne, The Crime of Infan-
ticide: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater, 6 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 47, 58 (1987)) (“How-
ever, the medical rationale for the [English infanticide] legislation was ‘simply more
conventional, conservative and less contentious than the reasons for the courts’ lenient
treatment of murdering mothers.’” (citation omitted)).
173. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008); see also People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 239
(Cal. 2002).
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ings through legal constructs, without relying on the potential
medical causes of neonaticide and infanticide as a justification.
Another example of a criminal charge crafted to reflect distinct
facts is vehicular homicide—a homicide caused during the operation
of a motor vehicle.174 Many state criminal codes make vehicular homi-
cide a separate offense from murder in recognition of the consistency
of its factual pattern that is distinct from other killings.175 Separate
infanticide legislation would similarly recognize the factual consis-
tency of these neonaticide and infanticide cases and their distinction
from other killings.176
It is important, finally, to underscore that infanticide legislation
need not necessarily apply to every case involving the killing of a child
by his or her mother. If evidence supported a first-degree murder
charge, infanticide legislation would not preclude such a charge or
conviction.177 As in England, furthermore, an American Infanticide
Act could remain entirely unavailable for mothers who kill children
over the age of one,178 justified either by the medical reasons con-
fronting new mothers, or by a legal construct recognizing the height-
ened factual similarities in cases involving victims under the age of
one.179 Either way, infanticide legislation would provide an option to
treat the subset of factually similar infanticide cases more coherently
and consistently.
Conclusion
The uniqueness of neonaticide and infanticide makes it difficult
to prevent these cases before they happen, as well as to attain consis-
tent sentencing in their aftermath. Accordingly, there have been seri-
ous sentencing inconsistencies among mothers convicted of these
acts, as well as between those convicted on the state level and on the
federal level. Additional sentencing inconsistencies occur under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for murder, even though neonaticide
and infanticide fall outside of the heartland of murders considered by
the Guidelines. In pursuit of greater sentencing consistency, this arti-
cle has proposed statutorily separating neonaticide and infanticide
174. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(c)(3) (West 1998); United States v. Gomez-Leon,
545 F.3d 777, 781, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that defendant had served two years in
prison for vehicular manslaughter under the California vehicular manslaughter statute).
175. See Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d at 785–86.
176. See supra Part I.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 8.
179. For possible legal constructs, see supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
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from other crimes to achieve greater sentencing consistency, as is cur-
rently done in England.
Although several proposals have been made in an effort to deal,
both prospectively and retrospectively, with neonaticide and infanti-
cide, statutory separation of these acts from murder and manslaughter
is the most effective way to finally achieve sentencing consistency in
the United States. In the meantime, in the dearth of such a statute,
the only consistency in this subset of criminal law will be its
unpredictability.
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